The purpose of this study is to investigate the semantic changes of English complex prepositions and to argue that they are explained on the basis of two possible mechanisms of semantic change.
Introduction
This study discusses the semantic changes of English complex prepositions and argues that they are explained on the basis of two possible mechanisms of semantic change: one is the Semantic Schema Preservation pathway (SSP) and the other Causal Meaning Orientation (CMO).
On English complex prepositions
The purpose of this study is to reveal possible linguistic and psychological mechanisms behind semantic shifts of English complex prepositions on the basis of cross-linguistic research. More specifically, this study argues that these semantic changes can be illuminated by the typological research of Yamaguchi (2005) . The following kind of example would be relevant to begin our discussion:
(1) We came in view of (=were able to see) a wide plain below.
View in the example above displays its literal meaning, describing the situation in which a feature of the landscape or a building comes within range of eyesight. Hoffmann (2005) studied how in view of has been used since 1650 and found that in many cases this was used in the literal sense until about 1850, but its literal meaning steadily decreased and has been rare in Present-day English. Now this complex preposition almost always carries a meaning which can be paraphrased by other complex prepositions such as 'in consideration' or 'on account of' as in (2).
(2) It is hard to see what else they could have done in view of the Secretary of State's decision.
In view of above has lost its original compositional meanings and has been regarded as a single unit. As Hoffmann argues, linguistic phenomena such as layering of meanings, semantic bleaching or generalisation, subjectification and contextinduced reinterpretation are the driving force behind the semantic shift of in view of. Based on empirical data, previous studies on grammaticalisation and the usage-based theory (or model) have argued that the use of utterances in actual contexts determine the representation of grammatical units in a speaker's mind. So the elements which frequently co-occur have a high probability of being merged as a single unit morphologically and also semantically. Although the previous studies above shed light on some aspects of the semantic nature of English complex prepositions, there has not been any research suggesting their general semantic change pathways applicable to all English complex prepositions. The purpose of this study is to suggest general paths of semantic change of English complex prepositions from the macro-perspective and to argue that these changes can be explained linguistically and psychologically on the basis of the crosslinguistic research of Yamaguchi (2005) . In Section Two, after a brief introduction of the previous research on English complex prepositions, we will argue that their semantic changes can be classified into two general patterns: the first general semantic shift is what may be called the Semantic Schema Preservation pathway and the second one is what may be called Causal Meaning Orientation. In Section Three, we will argue that these two general pathways are in harmony with general patterns of semantic shifts of adpositions (cases and pre/postpositions) found in the languages of the world: this would be obvious, as English complex prepositions, after being frequently used and becoming one unit, are categorised as prepositions.
On semantic shifts of English complex prepositions
English complex prepositions consist of simple prepositions and noun(s), and many are regarded as single-unit or chunk in terms of their syntax and semantics. As for their syntactic properties, through the mechanisms of chunking of contiguous units, they came to lose their compositionality, triggering decategorisation of their components. Semantically, meanings of each component of complex prepositions gradually came to be bleached, finally developing one generalised meaning. These kinds of linguistic changes have been discussed in the contexts of usage-based theory and grammaticalisation, and therefore this study is regarded as an attempt to make a contribution to these fields. According to Akimoto (2002, p.162) , English complex prepositions have not been widely researched. The pioneering work was Quirk and Mulholland (1964) , who showed that modern English has many complex prepositions, as follows. The following lists of English complex prepositions are taken from Quirk, et al. (1985, p.671 Causal meaning (or concept) is not a simple concept but consists of many different ones (on the way in which this concept has been discussed in the field of linguistics and philosophy, see, for example, Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) . According to Luraghi (2003, p.30) , "major causal roles are Agent, Instrument, and Cause, to which Reason, Force, Means, and/or Intermediary are usually added. " Quirk, et al. (1985, p.695) urges that the causal and purposive senses should be regarded not as two discrete categories but as two ends of the spectrum, including the following functions: Reason (e.g. 'He was fined for drunken driving') and Motive (e.g. 'She did it out of kindness'). Whether the semantic shift of individual English complex prepositions above is either SSP or CMO was determined on the basis of the author's intuition and the definition in (7), but as in other scientific fields, other researchers can easily re-examine the plausibility of the following semantic classification. And the examples for CMO below will help readers to evaluate if these complex prepositions indeed came to express causal meanings, as defined in (7). in aid of (The concert is given in aid of the blind.) SSP, CMO in (at, on) back of (=the part furthest from the direction that something moves in or faces) SSP in (on) behalf of (The money was raised in behalf of the strikers.) CMO in case of (In case of fire, ring the alarm bell.) CMO in charge of (=a position of care, control, or responsibility) SSP in consequence of (An investigation was initiated in consequence of the naval disaster.) CMO in (the) face of (He showed his courage in the face of danger.)
CMO(negative causative) in favor of (=approving of, in support of) SSP in front of (=in the position directly before) SSP in lieu of (=instead of) CMO(negative causative) in (the) light of (In light of the bad weather report, we should leave early.) CMO in need of (=the condition in which something necessary is missing) SSP in place of CMO(negative causative) in (the) process of (=performing) SSP in quest of (=search) SSP in respect of (He will be paid 100 pounds in respect of the work.) CMO in search of (They went in search of Miss Packard.) SSP, CMO in spite of (=despite) CMO(negative causative) in view of (In view of recent developments we do not think this step advisable.) This study assumes that spatial relations are linguistically and psychologically more basic than non-spatial ones and other senses may be appropriately hypothesised as ultimately derived from the spatial senses (see, for example, Anderson, 1971; Lyons, 1977, p.718; Stassen, 1985, pp.36-37; Croft, 1991) . One might ask why the spatial senses should be the sources for other, more abstract senses. Regarding this question, Jackendoff (1983, p.210) , for example, argues that "if there is any primacy to the spatial field, it is because this field is so strongly supported by non-linguistic cognition; it is the common ground for the essential faculties of vision, touch, and action. From an evolutionary perspective, spatial organization had to exist long before language." And spatial relations are more fundamental to our experience, so that they are the basis for conceptualisation of nonspatial relations (see also Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff 1987; Heine, et al., 1991; Langacker, 1991) . The intimate relation between spatial and temporal concepts, however, causes a serious problem to our study; as they are so closely related to each other, and often difficult to distinguish, it is very often the case that we cannot tell whether either spatial functions or temporal functions are responsible for later developments of other abstract functions. Therefore, we will treat these two concepts as a single concept (spatiotemporal concept) and do not attempt to answer the question of whether either spatial or temporal functions are responsible for creation of other rather abstract senses. The semantic roles in the same vertical box inside dotted lines share the same semantic structure: SOURCE, PATH, LOCATION, or GOAL, although they may belong to different domains (the spatiotemporal or nonspatiotemporal domain), as indicated in the horizontal boxes. These four different semantic structures can be schematically expressed as follows: The semantic roles or functions on the right of Table 6 possess the schematic structures on the left. As for correspondence between the schematic representations and semantic functions, this study follows previous studies (for LOCATION, see Quirk, et al., 1985, p.674; Sweetser, 1988, p.393; for SOURCE, see Langacker, 1991; Lindstromberg, 1998, p.26; Quirk, et al., 1985, p.674; Sweetser, 1988, p.393; for GOAL, see Langacker, 1991, p.399; Lindstromberg 1998, p.26; Quirk, et al., 1985, p.674; Sweetser, 1988, p.393; for VIA, see Langacker, 1991, p.404; Lindstromberg, 1997, p.26 Sweetser, 1988; Croft, 1991; Heine, et al., 1991) , but as far as the author's knowledge goes, no researchers have ever argued that semantics of adpositions always change towards causal meanings. Then, what is the motivation behind CMO? One possible answer for this can be attributed to the fact that the experience of causal relations between events in the world is fundamental to the representation of human knowledge and other cognitive processing such as explaining, comprehending and reasoning (Noordman, et al., 2000, p.36) . Taking the assumption of most cognitive-oriented studies, that is, our linguistic structures somehow reflect our knowledge or mental representation, then it is very natural for function words such as prepositions to come to express some kind of causality. Notice that causal concepts may be unique to human beings; Tomasello (1999, p.18) argues that nonhuman primates do not have an understanding of the intentionality of conspecifics and the causality of inanimate objects and events, and then "they just do not understand the world in intentional and causal terms" (1999, p.19) . On the contrary, children at an early stage learn to use causal schemes in reasoning processes (Noordman, et al., 2000, p.36) .
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